Philosophical Foundations of Science
References:
Andreev, I.L. (2015). Philosophical aspects of neurophysiology. Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 85(2), 173-179.
https://doi.org/10.1134/S1019331615020021
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Advances in technology have allowed researchers to study the brain and its function using noninvasive techniques. This has revolutionized neurophysiology, especially in terms of human consciousness, behaviour, and cognition. This article highlights achievements in the field of neurophysiology such as the discovery of mirror neurons, the asymmetry of the brain using “split brain” studies, the role of the blood-brain barrier and Pavlov’s idea of signal systems of human orientation in the surrounding world. The difference between the brain and the mind is where philosophical approaches are needed. Philosophy asks questions about the connection between consciousness and the brain and how the environment or society influences this interaction. This article suggests that the brain perceives and responds to external and internal factors before the person is even aware, indicating that the brain has a “physiological analog of free will.” Abstract thinking, self-reflection, and self-discipline are felt to differentiate humans from other animals from a philosophical perspective.
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Bechtel, W., Mandik, P., & Mundale, J. (2001). Neurophilosophical foundations: Philosophy meets the neurosciences. In W. Bechtel, P. Mandick, J.
Mundale & R. Stufflebeam (Eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A reader (pp.1-22). Wiley-Blackwell.
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This book’s chapter discusses philosophical issues in neurosciences and how philosophers seek to answer foundational questions, especially epistemic and metaphysical ones. The mind-body problem/dualism and personal identity are key areas of interest for philosophical thinking. The concept of being able to “know thyself” is considered to be a “philosopher’s thought experiment” since it requires a person to understand how their brain works in order to examine their thoughts or behaviours generated by this structure. The authors mention brain-processing research that requires the collaboration of scientists from various specialties. In the past, reaction time, error patterns, and other indirect measures were the primary means of studying the brain. However, with the advancement of tools to examine brain activity including positron emission tomography and functional magnetic resonance imaging, now cognitive psychologists can work with researchers in linguistics and computer science to better model cognitive tasks. The mind is considered to be an information-processing system. Philosophers’ have different views on how mental states are achieved, how electrical activity impacts neural processes, and whether or not the “laws in psychology would be independent of any laws characterizing brain processes.” The authors provide examples of philosophers’ beliefs about the validity of findings and consequences of future evidence. This chapter summarizes perspectives of explanation such as the deductive-nomological model and mechanistic explanations.
Jylkka, J. & Railo, H. (2019). Consciousness as a concrete physical phenomenon. Consciousness and Cognition, 74.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2019/102779
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This paper argues that experiences are concrete physical phenomena that can be observed and modelled. This opposes the empiricists’ view, which believes that only neural correlates of experiences can be observed as opposed to the experiences themselves. The authors use a metatheoretical framework to studying these concrete physical phenomena. The term physical is used following the logic that all concrete natural phenomena, including our experiences, are physical. The authors explain some of the difficulties associated with consciousness science. For example, the ambiguity of qualitative data for subjective experiences makes some researches avoid referring to them or acknowledging their existence. Moreover, conscious experience is often reduced to studying the neural mechanisms necessary for consciousness. This paper focuses on a concept called “Constitutive mechanisms of consciousness” which describes consciousness as a hierarchical process. Molecules and neuronal activity make up the lower level and combine to form a neural network at a system-level, which corresponds to consciousness. The goal is to measure consciousness itself instead of just its correlates, using an approach called Naturalistic Monism.
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Korzeniewski, B. (2017). Does matter matter? Should we mind the mind? Can philosophy be reduced to neurophysiology? Open Journal of
Philosophy, 7, 265-328. https://doi.org/10.4236/ojpp.2017.73017
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This paper argues that the brain’s neural network underlies the mind’s conceptual network. The author suggests that the brain’s cognitive center evolved due to persistent feedback loops, receiving signals from itself to form a representation within itself, which created consciousness and subjective psyche. The author’s states “The detailed structure of complex neural networks, especially those underlying the subjective psyche and (self-) consciousness, must evolve during individual development through the acquisition of new experiences and accumulation of memory based on formation/elimination/modification of (the weight of) synaptic connections.” This paper discusses the external world as physical reality and the internal world as our self-consciousness. The author supports a reductionist view, by shifting the focus from a philosopher’s propositions to neuroscientist’s observations since the “true” nature of conceptual networks cannot be known. This paper claims that it is impossible to treat the mind and the body as two independent phenomena with a bi-directional causal relationship due to their total dissimilarity. Simply put, this researcher believes that consciousness is a manifestation or by-product of neurophysiological brain functioning. Emphasis is placed on the physical-chemical process. This opinion is in keeping with epiphenomenalism, which suggests mental events are caused by physical events in the brain and do not have an effect on any physical events.
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Zuriff, G.E. (2005). Behaviorism makes its debut: A review of Lattal and Chase’s behaviour theory and philosophy. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour, 83(3), 315-322. https://doi.org/10.1901/jeab.2005.133-04
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This is a review of Lattal and Chase’s Behavior Theory and Philosophy, which is a collection of 21 papers from influential behaviourists that was presented at a conference at West Virginia University in 2000. Part I of the book, “Philosophical Foundations,” discusses philosophical systems such as empiricism, pragmatism, and realism, with emphasis on theory, constructs, causality among other philosophy of science topics. This section explores the questions “What is a science and how can the mind be studied scientifically?” B.F. Skinner is credited as the founder of empirical science and “operant psychology” as well as contributing to the development of social philosophy and the philosophy of science and the mind. His work acts as the starting point for other researchers, whether or not they accept or reject some of his ideas and is referred to as Skinner Inspired Behaviourism (SIB). Part II, “Interpretations,” views an interpretation as a hypothesis or rudimentary explanation that helps guide future research. This section focuses on ethics, intention, cognition, and imagination. For example, how and why certain behaviour is deemed to be “good” or “bad” and social problems are viewed from a philosophical lens. Part III, “Extensions to Research and Application” which reviews behaviour analysis research and the applications from basic science, is considered to be a weakness of the book since it is not clear why certain research programs were chosen as examples. The relevance of the included research is felt to be vague. According to this review, the main strength of Lattal and Chase’s book is the organized manner in which the information is provided (eg. section headings, internal cross-references, contributor introductions and conclusions). The editors wrote about broad themes in an opening chapter and chose respectable contributors for each chapter.
References:
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Anderson, T. (2020, May 29). 3 reasons why scientists (and you) need philosophy. Medium. Retrieved from https://medium.com/the-infinite-
universe/3-reasons-why-scientists-and-you-need-philosophy-a4ce2a1069d
Andreev, I.L. (2015). Philosophical aspects of neurophysiology. Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 85(2), 173-179.
https://doi.org/10.1134/S1019331615020021
Bechtel, W., Mandik, P., & Mundale, J. (2001). Neurophilosophical foundations: Philosophy meets the neurosciences. In W. Bechtel, P. Mandick, J.
Mundale & R. Stufflebeam (Eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A reader (pp.1-22). Wiley-Blackwell.
Jylkka, J. & Railo, H. (2019). Consciousness as a concrete physical phenomenon. Consciousness and Cognition, 74.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2019/102779
Korzeniewski, B. (2017). Does matter matter? Should we mind the mind? Can philosophy be reduced to neurophysiology? Open Journal of
Philosophy, 7, 265-328. https://doi.org/10.4236/ojpp.2017.73017
Lange, M. [Wireless Philosophy]. (2015, July 24). Philosophy-Epistemology: The Paradox of the Ravens [Video]. YouTube.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_SKmqh5Eu4Y
Laplane, L., Mantovani, P., Adolphs, R., Chang, H., Mantovani, A., McFall-Ngai, M., Rovelli, C., Sober, E. & Pradeu, T. (2019, March 5). Why science
needs philosophy. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 10(116), 3948-3952. Retrieved from